Google wants to be your carrier ... or at least sound like one to get what it wants

It used to be an article of faith that telecom carriers knew how to be Washington players and IT vendors didn't. Decades of Washington experience gave the "RBOCs" and "long distance carriers" hooks into the regulatory scene. A CEO like Ed Whitacre of SBC, the forerunner of today's AT&T, spent much if not most of his day on public policy and regulatory matters, including all those lawsuits SBC used get into with other carriers and the FCC. I'm sure all that focus on federal issues comes in handy now that Whitacre runs the essentially government-owned GM.

Software and hardware vendors, by contrast, were babes in the woods when it came to politics. Typically their CEOs wanted to spend all their days working on their company's products ... silly them! When the U.S. government hauled Microsoft into court in the 1990s for trying to perpetuate a monopoly in operating software, much was made of Bill Gates' shock and ignorance over the ways of Washington.

In fact, it was the Microsoft antitrust case that began to radically change this perspective among IT vendors. Now the big, famous players have become heavy hitters inside the Beltway. It's partly in that light that telecom managers should understand this week's headlines about Google wanting to get into the telecom business by building ultra-fast broadband connections.

Google sits on one side of a debate in Washington over the concept of "net neutrality." That's the notion, which Google supports, that providers must be essentially "agnostic" about the applications sent over their networks. The companies that control the pipes -- the telcos and the cable companies -- pretty much all oppose this idea, saying that net neutrality is an appealing-sounding euphemism for outlawing traffic engineering. The carriers are happy to assert that the same concept applied to enterprise networks would get in the way of your making sure that voice, video and certain data apps get expedited treatment.

Of course, you buy these services from the carriers, so traffic engineering is necessitated by the resource constraint you face -- your budget for buying overall bandwidth to dozens, hundreds or thousands of sites. The carriers build these networks, so arguably they're in control of rolling out as much capacity as they want. Naturally they can claim that money doesn't grow on trees even for them, but part of Google's point appears to be that the carriers can do better and Google's going to show them how.

But in order to do that, Google is going to have to go through the slog of partnering with municipalities for rights of way, franchise fees and all the flora and fauna of facilities-based telecommunications down to the last mile. And even they say it's really a testbed, not coincidentally announced just before the FCC is due to release a National Broadband Plan. Whether Google would really push for net neutrality after building a network of their own is clearly the impression they want to give, but not at all certain in reality.

So it's easy to toss Google's initial announcement to the side as being impractical and short of any scale to matter to enterprises. But there are a couple of things to keep in mind as more news comes out about this.

One is that IT vendors really do get peeved at the telecom industry for what they see as insolence and manipulation of the timeline for rolling out universal high-speed access. Some years ago Cisco CEO John Chambers castigated the RBOCs for purportedly costing him measurable earnings per share by being more interested in merging with one another than building out fiber to the home (and indeed, it took cable entry into high-speed Internet access to get the telcos off their duff).

The other thing is that Google has enormous capital, even by telecom standards, to do the obvious alternative to building a network: buying a network. When Qwest appeared to get into a failed negotiation over selling its long-haul network to Level 3, the talks reportedly broke down over a price gap somewhere in the neighborhood of $1 to $2.5 billion. A back-of-the-napkin calculation at the high end of that range shows that a Google could step into such talks for lunch money. They'd simply have to issue about 4.7 million shares of Google at today's stock price, hardly any dilution for current holders of Google's 317 million shares.

Of course, Google almost certainly realizes that the real key to network entry is the local loop. So it would either have to leverage its investment in the Sprint-backed Clearwire 4G network to complete the connection, or pair a local build and long distance buy.

Regardless, when you keep in mind that Cisco is now a leading PBX supplier, the famous names of the IT industry are buzzing all over telecom. If they have mixed motives, not always sincerely expressed, in doing so, let's face it: That would be entirely consistent with the culture of the telecom industry! Google and some others may not be making an impact yet, but they're certainly welcome to the club, and welcome to keep telling us what they think they have to offer.

Is it safe to send text messages in Europe? Mobile caps and the corporate user

The following is a guest post by TC2 Senior Consultant Mark Sheard, who is based in London.

Did 2009 mark the end of overcharging for text messaging and data applications while roaming in Europe? You might think so because of last year's European Union roaming caps on texting and data and video applications, as well as an accompanying overall mechanism designed to put a brake on soaring mobile bills.

But that's only part of the story. European and multinational enterprises can only get the full benefit of these measures to solve the chronic problem of runaway mobile charges if they take additional steps. These corporate 'bill shocks' (as the EU put it) might not be as immediately obvious as those, for example, on my teenage daughter's mobile, but close inspection could be more shocking than you thought!

Telecom managers with responsibility for users traveling through Europe should remember the unique aspect of mobile cost management within the EU. The "single market" paradoxically can make it more difficult to keep costs under control. Roaming charges often begin at every national boundary even as users freely move about the continent.

Viviane Reding, the EU Telecoms Commissioner, was addressing this when she described the EU's objective in enacting mobile caps: "What we want to achieve is simple: sending text messages or downloading data via a mobile phone while being in another EU country should not be substantially more expensive than at home. This is the logic of the borderless single market."

Accordingly, since July 1st of 2009, roaming charges for SMS (text messages) have been capped by the EU at a retail cost of €0.11, which compare very favorably with the average cost of a "roamed" text message in the EU between October 2007 and March 2008 of €0.29. The key elements of the regulation are as follows:

-- Limits the price for sending a text message while abroad at €0.11. Receiving an SMS in another EU country remains free of charge.

-- Reduces the cost of surfing the web and downloading movies or video programs with a mobile phone while abroad by introducing a maximum wholesale cap of €1 per megabyte downloaded. This limit will be decreased each year.

-- Further reduces prices for mobile roaming calls with a maximum tariff of €0.43 for making a call and €0.19 for receiving one.

-- Introduces per-second billing after the first 30 seconds for calls made and immediately for calls received.

But these regulations are only a start. Most businesses of scale should be securing competitive rates that are better than the regulated capped rates. If a quick review of your contracts shows that you haven't got better rates, yet you have many roaming users, it is time to plan for a review of your wireless telecoms spend. This should start with an early interview with your incumbent provider's account manager.

In negotiated custom corporate wireless contracts, market leading pricing for roaming usage tracks substantially below the regulated price caps. The significance of the roaming rates cannot be underestimated -- for many MNCs roaming spend can be 50% or more of their mobile costs. Hence, securing competitive rates for voice, data and SMS (texting) is crucial.

Determining whether you have good rates for voice, SMS and data might start with a look at the EU provided information on tariffs. The EU site will give you rates for roaming across Europe. Some might find it a useful starting point to see whether or not their negotiated rates are any better than standard supplier pricing.

Remember that this site is restricted to European countries and published rates. As good as it is to see efforts to provide more open information to consumers, spotting whether you are securing rates commensurate with your corporate spend is not in reality possible from the EU's site. But an interesting exercise is to click on the little timeline down the side of the rate tables and see the differences in prices over time. Immediately, it shows the continued downward trend in charges that telecoms managers should be seeking to emulate for their own contracts.

For one thing, it illustrates that operators really do need some help and encouragement to pass on price reductions to the consumer. Note particularly the drop in voice pricing in 2007 when EU regulation was first brought in! Would these have dropped so significantly without regulation?

For SMS and data, the recent step change down is initially likely to mean some stagnation in the rate of change, but in reality for most MNCs, the recent regulation should have a pull through effect on roaming data pricing. But negotiating improved SMS and data roaming rates in isolation may not be straightforward. Ideally, a structured competitive process will bring the greatest returns in terms of cost reduction, and typically the greatest opportunity for the provider to give you the best deal will be if you widen the scope of the procurement.

Mobile SMS and mobile access to the Internet and corporate networks are growing exponentially, and whilst the EU capping on roaming charges is very good news the caps should be regarded as the starting point for your negotiations, not the end.

AT&T, the harvesting instinct, and the end of POTS

For as long as anyone can remember, AT&T has been the carrier that's held on the longest to legacy products. In recent times, AT&T has been happy to let users continue to subscribe to its global business dial-up Internet service until they're ready for AT&T's broadband virtual tunneling service. AT&T has also let corporate WANs sail along on frame relay without putting out a marker on ending frame relay orders or contract renewals, as first Sprint and then Verizon have done.

And there will probably be some companies using AT&T for straight-on, long-haul, T1/T3 private lines in the year 2030 just as in 2010.

So it was jarring when AT&T grabbed some publicity at the end of last year with what looked like a request to the FCC to retire the public switched telephone network. AT&T severing itself from POTS, or Plain Old Telephone Service? It didn't seem right.

Understanding AT&T's about-face on maintaining legacy networks requires an understanding of the concept of financial harvesting. One of the best illustrations of harvesting came during an odd period in telecom carrier finance back in the mid-1990s -- basically a few years before and after enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

Back then, the Internet was emerging in its browser-enabled incarnation as the World Wide Web, the corporate telecom deal culture was thriving, and TV airwaves and telemarketing lines were buzzing with pitches for 10-cent, 7-cent, and 5-cent long distance minutes. Yet when AT&T held its quarterly earnings conference calls, the first question Wall Street analysts would invariably ask was why AT&T had only raised its basic, no-plan long distance rate from 25 cents a minute to 26 cents, not 27 cents. Wouldn't Aunt Mary from Kalamazoo, who would never in a million years switch to MCI or Sprint, overlook a larger increase and happily pay the bill?

AT&T was essentially harvesting its no-plan customers for a revenue stream for as long as these customers existed. And the analysts, almost to AT&T's annoyance, wanted them to do even more of it. Not until somebody rang a bell around 1997-1998 and the analysts realized that AT&T had to compete elsewhere for voice and data business did the harvesting issue start to fade.

Now look at AT&T's situation today. AT&T Mobility is thriving and sales of the iPhone are zooming. AT&T's share of the enterprise networking market is basically what it's been for years, and with the decline of Sprint it's even threatening to establish a virtual duopoly with Verizon.

But AT&T's consumer telephony business seems to be slipping away. Like the incumbent local businesses of Verizon and Qwest, AT&T is losing residential landlines at a remarkable pace, now edging close to 1% a month. The result is the reverse of harvesting: AT&T says it's bleeding from the need to maintain all-copper loops in a mass market that's beginning to reject them, and it wants to get out rather than stay in as long as possible.

Of course, AT&T, Verizon and Qwest get some of their landline customers right back when the same households buy their broadband packages. And the broadband and telephony customers that the cable companies win instead represent fair-and-square marketplace losses for the telcos. But that only seems to reinforce the reverse-harvesting instinct, feeding AT&T's argument that it needs to massively shift resources.

Aside from the fact that AT&T in the meantime hasn't lost its near-monopoly dedicated access business in its local territories, here's the problem with simply accepting AT&T's conclusion that the PSTN should be retired: From a business user standpoint, there's a little more to the legacy network than consumer migration to cell phones and broadband. As our friend Eric Krapf of VoiceCon/NoJitter has already pointed out, AT&T hasn't quite defined the PSTN to be retired, leaving us to assume they mean everything. But what about Class 5 switches and their unique functionality that's still in the process of being emulated in various VoIP services? What about the fact that many of the poles, trenches and conduits are the same for both older and newer services?

And what about all the people who make calls to the businesses who make up the enterprise market? If they don't have a cell phone or a broadband triple-play package, are they out of luck, and your business out of a sale?

Many business customers would benefit enormously if AT&T does what it says that PSTN retirement will free it to do: help create universal, affordable broadband. Widespread remote-agent call center functionality, broad-based telecommuting, and many facets of unified communications do rely on a pervasive broadband network.

But it's important to realize that AT&T is responding in a classic "lobbying" fashion to the current broadband stimulus, which requires the FCC to develop a national broadband plan. In effect AT&T is saying that if there has to be universal broadband, there can't be universal narrowband. That's either one of those unintended consequences that can result from regulatory initiatives, or an unproven assertion of investment motivation by an experienced Washington player.

At this point I think there are two key things for corporate telecom professionals to remember. One is that AT&T, with all of its legacy pressures and characteristic behavior patterns, has many piece-parts. In this case we're clearly talking about an AT&T whose heart is the former RBOC SBC, not the former interexchange giant.

The other is that some of the regulatory nuance got lost in some of the initial reports. What AT&T is supporting, in the context of a question posed by the FCC, is the initiation of a Notice of Inquiry about the PSTN, which is a more preliminary proceeding than even a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which itself has many procedural checkpoints before it results in new rules. It's unlikely that AT&T really wants to lose all its POTS customers in one fell swoop right now. More likely, it's just drawing a line in the sand.

So we'll have some time to watch this, and the market will invariably shift more along the way. Let me know if you have thoughts of your own on this fascinating matter that threatens to turn the tables of telecom history upside down.

Something's gotta give: Universal service and the 14.1% surcharge

The word is out, and if you're hearing it here for the first time, I apologize: The federal universal service surcharge for the first quarter of 2010 will be 14.1% of applicable interstate (including access) and international charges. Man oh man!

And I've noticed an interesting phenomenon. The FCC announced the new percentage rate in this announcement last Friday, but as of today, this announcement appears nowhere on the list of FCC "Headlines" on the FCC's home page. Yet somehow, FCC announcements from the same day about panelists for "a workshop on Speech, Democracy and the Open Internet" and a speech by one of the FCC commissioners about Guglielmo Marconi (you know, the guy who won a Nobel Prize 100 years ago for basically inventing the radio) are right there on the home page! And it took until today for the FCC to add the announcement to its required spot at its special URL for contribution factor notices.

Maybe the whole thing is too embarrassing? A levy of 5% feels like a tax. Something running 10% is the kind of surcharge we in telecom are used to. But edging toward 15%? Deep down, all parties know this is out of whack.

I encourage anyone looking for a constructive deep dive and how to provide input on the what-to-do from a public policy standpoint to check out LB3's regulatory advice and advocacy practice. They've been flagging this issue forever. In the meantime, be aware that this breaking point is being reached by an all-too-foreseeable crossing of lines between mild but steady declines in the carrier-reported revenues for basic telecommunications services and marked increases in carrier demands for the universal service funds.

In particular, the wireless carriers (who are no slouches when it comes to taxes and fees) have really ramped up their demands on the "High-Cost" program -- you know, the part of universal service that's mostly thought of as helping independent telcos to reach far-flung subscribers in less densely populated areas of the country.

It's not like the FCC hasn't been doing anything about this. They've now capped how much the wireless carriers can get, in a decision recently upheld by the federal appeals court in Washington, D.C. But these stopgap measures only illustrate how much fundamental USF reform is needed, something the FCC and all parties to the regulatory world have to know.

With every surcharge shock, we at TC2 redouble our reminder that the higher these fees and passalongs go, the more impact you get by gauging them them in a competitive framework. Part of what we know is going on is that the large U.S. carriers, few though they may be, at any given moment do feel some reluctance to actually levy the passalong on freshly won major data networking business. That's particularly true now with MPLS ports and CoS packages, even if the FCC has gotten hip to MPLS's revenue impact on the carriers.

So any time you have either:

-- a service for which the carrier won't assess USF vs. a service for which it will, or

-- the same service competitively bid to multiple carriers who make different commitments to passing along or not passing along the surcharge (provided you've specifically asked)

then you have a dollar difference that's every bit as significant as the rate element pricing itself. And the higher the USF (or other) surcharge on the carriers' revenue goes, the bigger the impact of this passalong vs. no-passalong commitment on you.

There's more to come, including what may be more impetus for universal service reform as the surcharge factor looks more and more ridiculous. The FCC may not make it easy to find about this on their online front door, but we're happy to shout about this issue in all its ramifications for as long as it takes.

The tax trap looming inside your employees' corporate-liable cell phones

The following is a guest post by LB3 partner Kevin DiLallo, whose practice includes a specialty in the negotiation of enterprise wireless service contracts.

As if the high level of taxes and surcharge-generating "mandates" on wireless plans weren't enough, enterprises also have to be concerned with a fundamental, tax-related issue relating to what their employees do with their mobile devices.

If you provide corporate-liable devices and plans to employees, and those employees use them for personal conversations and transactions, then at least in theory you are providing a taxable employee benefit. Under the law, your employees are required to log every call or Internet session on a company-subsidized device and note its business purpose (if it has one). It's then the employer's responsibility to report the value of this benefit on your employees' W-2s, and it's their responsibility to report the amount of the benefit as income.

What's more, if you don't have a policy requiring your employees to keep records of their personal and business calls and the business purpose for each of the latter, then you and the employees must report the full value of company-subsidized phones and service as additional income to the employees.

Are most companies complying with this requirement? As far as we know, not many, largely because of the enormous burden on them and their employees.

So is the IRS doing anything about it? The current IRS commissioner has actually gone on record as saying that the requirement to track personal usage of corporate devices is anachronistic and should be repealed. But that's something only Congress can do, and in the meantime, the Treasury Department could pressure the IRS to go the other direction and step up enforcement as a source of badly needed federal tax revenue.

Thus the dilemma for corporate telecom managers: How does one balance the realistic risk of failing to measure this purported employee benefit against the hassle of forcing all your users to keep track of their personal usage? Surely, there must be a logical, common-sense way to ensure compliance, many users feel.

One idea we're sometimes asked about is whether you can build a bulwark against IRS enforcement action by issuing a corporate policy banning personal use of corporate-liable devices. The answer is no -- according to policy, the IRS is looking for actual logs that demonstrate how much or how little employees make personal use of their mobile devices.

But there are other developments in the works that could ease the pain of compliance:

-- Some applications can be loaded on phones that require an employee to use a routine such as pressing "P" (personal call) or "B" (business call) before making any calls. Ideally, once an employee dials a number the first time and enters the appropriate code, the phone remembers what type of call it is. One vendor that offers such an application is Arizona-based Syncpointe, LLC.

-- Compliance would be greatly eased with a "safe harbor" -- a type of simple statement of minimal personal use that companies could adopt in place of full record-keeping. The IRS has initiated a rulemaking proceeding to solicit public comment on a safe harbor or other compliance alternatives. It's also possible that IRS will adopt some sort of mitigating interpretation that will alleviate the burden on companies until Congress acts one way or the other.

-- Despite the fiscal pressures, bills were introduced in January in both the U.S. Senate (S. 144) and House of Representatives (H.R. 690) to eliminate the taxability of subsidized wireless service. Regrettably, the bills have gone nowhere since they were introduced.

Given all the cross-currents, it's certainly an uncomfortable dilemma for managers to decide whether to take immediate compliance steps. For most enterprises we recommend consulting internal counsel on what to do now. But the greatly heightened awareness of mobile telephony is bringing the issue to the forefront, and it's important to understand that simply issuing a blanket policy banning personal use with no internal enforcement or record-keeping is unlikely to accomplish the goal. As demands on the U.S. Treasury mount, we would not be surprised to see increased enforcement activity in this area.

One final word: Some companies have taken the position that, to avoid the risk of an audit, they will eliminate all corporate-liable mobile devices and allow employees to use personal devices for business purposes, perhaps using stipends or expense reimbursement to compensate the employees for the cost of the devices and services. For both financial and data security reasons, we advise against this approach. Stay tuned for more on this issue.

Unpacking the net neutrality issue for enterprises

Do you think the Internet should be open? I presume you do. Do you think the Internet should stay deregulated? I presume you do.

Now tell me what your position is on "net neutrality," if you know what that is.

Answer: You're both for and against it.

How's that again? Well, corporate network professionals who are plugged in to the Washington telecom scene -- such as the members of the Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users Committee, which is represented by LB3 -- probably understand the trick I employed in framing the question.

Like so many telecom regulatory issues, the net neutrality issue features advocates on both sides who sell the merits of their position based on a similar-sounding benefit to users.

Net neutrality is the notion that major ISPs -- which these days essentially means the big telecom and cable companies -- should not discriminate among types of content. It also means that providers should not give favored access to their own content-based services if another provider wants to reach their subscribers with a similar service.

The FCC has for a while had some vanilla-sounding principles ensuring freedom of movement of content around the Internet and freedom of access. But today the commission initiated a rulemaking which would enshrine the specific idea of net neutrality under regulations.

The FCC's move is getting a fair bit of attention. That's partly because it's a pet issue of new FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski, who was a Harvard Law School buddy of President Obama's. It's also partly because it pits two major vendor groups against each other.

Those who say they want the Internet to be "open" are essentially a proxy for content providers such as Google, Amazon, eBay and others who fear (or say they fear) the control that AT&T, Verizon and big cable companies have over the pipes to subscribers. They support net neutrality -- in fact, they've practically sponsored the issue.

Those who say they want the Internet to "stay deregulated" are exactly the big carriers such as AT&T and Verizon who say net neutrality either is unnecessary or would be downright harmful. They've complained that traffic management practices of the sort that net neutrality would appear to knock out are perfectly normal. And they say that without the freedom to employ these practices, broadband fiber and mobile networks won't be built out any further.

So you see, the framing trick really isn't mine -- it's inherent in the issue. In fact, while the impact of net neutrality on enterprise users is not direct, at least not yet, the two sides of the debate do in fact mirror two natural instincts of our corporate user marketplace.

Business users instinctively understand that AT&T and Verizon are growing in market power. While the scattered examples of these companies supposedly knocking out content aren't very convincing so far, users know that a limited number of suppliers (especially in the last mile) threatens trouble down the road both on price and control.

But users also understand the concepts of class of service, congestion management, and traffic shaping on the engineering side, and the basic idea of volume discounts on the pricing side. At least conceptually, net neutrality can come across as a naive and artificial guarantor of access to content, no matter its bandwidth, sensitivity to latency, or point of origin, although some net neutrality advocates say their position is more sophisticated than that.

All this has become a growing concern as end-users rapidly step up their demand for mobile broadband applications. Spectrum isn't just there for the taking, and the idea of a regulatorily mandated free-for-all won't achieve much if all it does is cause congestion for everyone. Expect the wireless issues to be front and center in the net neutrality debate, much more so than if it had been proposed in this way even as recently as two years ago.

I know that the Ad Hoc Committee will be participating in this rulemaking and assessing it from enterprises' dual and overlapping roles as purchasers of network services and providers of increasingly critical e-commerce streams even in prosaic, non-glamorous industries. Stay tuned for more on this issue as it works through the FCC process. And remember to get the whole story, not just some big vendor's framing of the issue.

What antitrust law has to say about the next wave of telecom mergers

The following is a guest post by Hank Levine, a partner with our law firm affiliate, Levine, Blaszak, Block & Boothby, LLP.

It's spring, and a young investment banker's thoughts turn to ... telecom mergers. Since the original 1984 AT&T divestiture, there has been a spate of wireline and/or wireless mergers every few years. The last big wave saw AT&T gobbled up by SBC and the corpse of MCI bought by Verizon. Those were announced in early 2005 and closed about a year later. It's been over four years since those deals were hatched, so it must be time for another round.

Sure enough, reports are now circulating that Qwest has put its long distance network up for sale. And every week brings a fresh round of rumors about Sprint merging with ... someone. Usually AT&T and Verizon are named as likely buyers. But we're looking at a different world than we were in 2005, and for two (related) reasons, I think that neither of the surviving telecom mastodons is a likely buyer of Qwest's LD assets or Sprint.

First, the market is different than it was ten or even five years ago.Wireless services are a much larger factor, and AT&T and Verizon are by far the two largest wireless players, particularly in the enterprise market (where Sprint is weak and T-Mobile is virtually absent). In wireline interexchange services, Sprint has declined from a reasonably strong to a very weak third. Qwest has largely stood pat while working through a huge debt hangover. Although mergers and acquisitions over the past eight years have made the next tier of players (Level 3, XO, Global Crossing and tw telecom) larger, none is capable of being the principal network services provider to large enterprises. The bottom line is that the AT&T-Verizon duopoly really does look like a duopoly -- something AT&T and MCI never achieved.

Second, the Bush Administration's tolerance of market concentration and aversion to antitrust law as a tool for addressing it has given way to what promises to be a much more activist approach on the part of the Obama Administration. From 2001 through 2008 the Justice Department rarely came across a proposed merger it didn't like. No one expects that to be true from 2009 to 2012.

It's fair to ask whether it matters who buys Sprint or Qwest's LD assets. There are two major players, after all, so whatever the shape of the market it's not a near-monopoly and won't be unless AT&T buys Verizon or vice-versa. Should even a vigilant antitrust enforcer care if a major player acquires one of the half dozen or so smaller participants in a market?

To answer that it's worth remembering 1999, when MCI (then flying high under the leadership of the charismatic but felonious Bernie Ebbers) announced that it was acquiring Sprint in a move designed (according to CNET) to "create a telecommunications titan able at last to take on market leader AT&T on relatively equal terms." To snatch the prize, MCI beat out a (then-independent) BellSouth. Eight months later, in July of 2000, the Clinton Justice Department filed a lawsuit to block the deal, and the merger was promptly abandoned.

There were a number of rationales for the Justice Department's opposition to the MCI-Sprint deal. One that received a lot of press at the time was the theory that the combined company would have a monopoly over Internet traffic. But with one exception, all of the objections could have been answered by requiring the new entity to divest itself of certain assets, standard operating procedure in large mergers.

That exception -- and the reason I'm remembering the story -- was the difference between two and three strong competitors in a market. Despite outward appearances of intense rivalry, duopolies are actually quite stable -- each of the two participants in the market is aware of (and able to react quickly to) the pricing and price-related behavior of the other, with the result that robust pricing competition is less common than parallel price increases. The classic example in telecommunications is the cellular market in the 1980s and early 1990s, when, due to government licensing policy, there were two providers in each market and prices were high and stayed that way.

When there are three competitors, by contrast, the weakest often "cheats" on the oligopoly, benefiting customers and competition by offering pricing or other concessions to gain market share. Four is better than three, five is better than four, and so on. But the big break from a competitive standpoint is between two and three providers, which is why the deal rumor of the day has to be judged by whether it preserves the third major carrier option.

As an attorney who has been representing large users in negotiating telecom agreements for 20+ years, I have some experience with this phenomenon. Indeed, I was interviewed and then deposed by the Justice Department when it was investigating the MCI-Sprint merger. I testified that AT&T, MCI and Sprint were the only three carriers capable of serving as the primary provider of interexchange services to enterprise customers, and my deposition was cited a number of times in the papers filed by the Justice Department to block the merger. MCI was well aware of the concern, and sought to counter it by arguing that Qwest was also a substantial provider of telecom services to large enterprise customers. To prove that, it filed a list of (as I recall) 80 deals between large users and Qwest -- of which all but three proved on examination to be with telecom resellers, not end-users.

Ten years later, Sprint is weaker, but it remains the only carrier other than AT&T and Verizon that serves as the primary provider of complex network and wide-area services to large enterprise customers. Qwest is fourth, but a distant fourth, and its enterprise business remains thin and concentrated in commodity services -- voice minutes, not managed MPLS networks.

So at least from a customer perspective, the acquisition of Qwest's LD network or Sprint by anyone but AT&T or Verizon would be a positive development -- it would strengthen competition in the enterprise market by strengthening the market's "Chrysler." Conversely, the acquisition of Sprint or Qwest's LD assets by AT&T or Verizon would disproportionately weaken competition in the enterprise market.

In another nod to automobiles, note that it doesn't matter from a competitive perspective if the buyer is foreign or domestic, or if it is a big supplier in another market (such as IBM, which actually once owned 20% of MCI). In 1999 Deutsche Telecom was widely viewed as a potential purchaser of Sprint, and while that might have dismayed the breast-beating flag-wavers, it would have preserved/enhanced competition. All that matters is that the third provider not be bought by one of the first two.

As the capital markets recover, a play for Sprint is about as likely as clouds in Seattle, heat in Atlanta, and hot air in Washington, D.C. We'll see how it plays out as the season progresses.